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I. INTRODUCTION 
The general rule in criminal proceedings is that ignorance of the law or 
a misunderstanding of the applicability of the law is no excuse.2 This rule 
is based on a common law presumption that the law is "definite and 
knowable" by everyone? Based on the magnitude and complexity of modern 
tax law, however, special treatment has been accorded to criminal tax 
offenders, including a bona fide ignorance of the law defense.4 Yet, 
disagreement arises as to whether the ignorance or misunderstanding defense 
should be scrutinized under a subjective or objective standard.s With the 
exception of the United States Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, the circuits 
have held that a subjective standard should be applied to defendants' asserted 
belief that they were ignorant of, or misunderstood, the law.6 In Cheek v. 
United States, the United States Supreme Court, by a six to two vote, upheld 
this majority position.7 
II. FAcrs AND HOLDING 
Petitioner John L. Cheek has been employed by American Airlines as a 
pilot since 1973.8 Cheek properly filed his income tax returns from 1969 to 
1979.9 With the exception of a frivolous return filed in 1982, he did not file 
tax returns from 1980 to 1986.10 During this period, Cheek initiated several 
1. 111 S. Ct. 604 (1991). 
2. See infra notes 132-33 and accompanying text. 
3. See infra note 57 and accompanying text. 
4. See infra notes 67 & 136 and accompanying text. 
5. See infra notes 108-09 and accompanying text. 
6. Id. 
7. See infra note 146 and accompanying text. 
8. United States v. Cheek, 882 F.2d 1263, 1265 (7th Cir. 1989) [hereinafter Cheek 
If, cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1108 (1990), vacated, HI S. Ct. 604 (1991). 
9. Cheek v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 604, 606 (1991) [hereinafter Cheek II]. 
10. Cheek I, 882 F.2d at 1265. Additionally, from January, 1980, to January, 
1120 MISSOURI LA W REVIEW [Vol. 56 
civil suits against American Airlines and the Internal Revenue Service (the 
IIServicell).ll The suit against American alleged wrongful withholding of 
taxes from his wages.12 In the suits against the Service, Cheek asserted 
various reasons for not being required to pay any income tax, most of which 
were rejected or discharged for being frivolous.13 As a result of his failure 
to file tax returns, Cheek was indicted for ten violations of federal income tax 
law in the United States District Court for the Northern District of lllinois.14 
He was charged with three counts of willfully attempting to evade income tax 
for the years 1980, 1981, and 1983, in violation of 26 U.S.C. section 7201.15 
In addition, Cheek was charged with six counts of willfully failing to file a 
federal income tax return for the years 1980, 1981, and 1983 through 1986, 
in violation of 26 U.S.C. section 7203.16 
1981, Cheek filed frivolous W-4 fonns claiming a rising number of withholding 
allowances. These allowances eventually reached as many as sixty. He subsequently 
claimed a complete exemption from taxation on his W-4 fonns. ld. 
11. ld. at 1265. 
12. ld. Cheek, along with another American Airlines employee, filed this suit in 
March, 1982. Cheek II, 111 S. Ct. at 607. 
13. Cheek II, 111 S. Ct. at 607 n.3. Cheek's suit against the Service in the Tax 
Court in April, 1982, asserted that he was not a taxable person under the Internal 
Revenue Code, that his wages were not income, and several other analogous claims. 
Along with four others, Cheek filed a suit against the United States and the 
Commissioner of the Service in the federal district court stating that withholding taxes 
from their wages violated the sixteenth amendment. In 1985, Cheek filed claims with 
the Service seeking refunds for taxes withheld from his earnings in 1983 and 1984. 
When these claims were disallowed, he brought suit in the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of lllinois alleging that withholding was "an unconstitutional 
taking of his property" and again that his wages were not income. Dismissing the case 
as frivolous, the district court assessed $1,500 in attorney fees and costs and a 
sanction, under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in the amount of 
$10,000. This sanction was subsequently reduced on appeal to $5,000 by the United 
States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit. Cheek II, 111 S. Ct. at 607 n.3. See also 
Cheek v. Doe, 828 F.2d 395 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 955 (1987). 
14. Cheek II, 111 S. Ct. at 606. 
15. ld. at 606-07. The statute reads: 
§ 7201. Attempt to evade or defeat tax. 
Any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat 
any tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof shall, in addition to 
other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction 
thereof, shall be fined not more than $100,000 ($500,000 in the case of a 
corporation), or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both, together with 
the costs of prosecution. 
I.R.C. § 7201 (1988). 
16. Cheek II, 111 S. Ct. at 606. The statute reads: 
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Cheek represented himself at trial and, during the course of his testimony, 
admitted that he did not file tax returns during the years in dispute.17 He 
testified that in early 1978 he began attending seminars sponsored by an 
association that promoted among other things, the unconstitutionality of the 
federal tax system. IS As his defense, Cheek claimed that, in addition to his 
own research, the indoctrination he received from this group firmly established 
his belief that the tax laws were unconstitutionally ,enforced, thus making his 
actions from 1980 to 1986 lawful. 19 Based on this belief, Cheek argued that 
he could not have acted with the willfulness required for the various offenses 
for which he was accused.20 
While administering its instructions, the district court explained to the 
jury that "willfulness" required the government to prove "the voluntary and 
intentional violation of a known legal duty.lt2l The court forewarned that 
merely showing mistake, ignorance, or negligence were not sufficient to prove 
willfulness.22 "An objectively reasonable good-faith misunderstanding of the 
law," advised the court, "would negate willfulness but mere disagreement with 
the law would not.,,23 In commenting on Cheek's beliefs about the income 
tax system, the court instructed the jury that if it found that Cheek "honestly 
and reasonably believed that he was not required to pay income taxes or to 
§ 7203. Willful failure to file return, supply information or pay tax. 
Any person required under this title to pay any estimated tax or tax, 
or required by this title or by regulations made under authority thereof to 
make a return, keep any records, or supply any information, who willfully 
fails to pay such estimated tax or tax, make such return, keep such records, 
or supply such information, at the time or times required by law or 
regulations, shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty 
of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more 
than $25,000 ($100,000 in the case of a corporation), or imprisoned not 
more than 1 year, or both, together with the costs of prosecution .... 
I.R.C. § 7203 (West Supp. 1991). 
17. Cheek II, 111 S. Ct. at 607. 
18. Included as speakers at those meetings were attorneys who allegedly gave 
professional opinions about the "invalidity of the federal income tax laws." Id. Cheek 
introduced into evidence a letter from a lawyer asserting that the sixteenth amendment 
did not authorize a tax on wages and salaries but only on gain or profit. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 607-08. 
23. Id. at 608. 
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file tax returns, II the jury should return with a verdict of not guilty.24 After 
deliberating for several hours, the jury sent out a note to the judge stating:25 
We have a basic disagreement between some of us as to if Mr. Cheek 
honestly and reasonably believed that he was not required to pay income 
taxes . .. Page 32 [the relevant jury instruction] discusses good faith 
misunderstanding and disagreement. Is there any clarification you can give 
us on this point?26 
In response, the district judge issued a supplemental instruction stating that an 
individual's opinion that the tax laws are violative of his constitutional rights 
is not a good faith misunderstanding of the law.27 In addition, the instruction 
stipulated that a personal disagreement with the tax collection system and 
policies of the government does not establish a good faith misunderstanding 
of the law.28 Despite the ~eemingly dispositive nature of this instruction, the 
jury sent out another note at the end of the first day reaffirming its inability 
to reach a verdict because of disagreement over whether the petitioner 
honestly and reasonably believed that he was not required to pay income 
tax.29 Upon resuming their deliberations, the jury was given an additional 
instruction by the judge which stated: 
U[A]n honest but unreasonable belief is not a defense and does not negate 
willfulness," and that "[a]dvice or research resulting in the conclusion that 
wages of a privately employed person are not income or that the tax laws 
are unconstitutional is not objectively reasonable and cannot serve as the 
basis for a good faith misunderstanding of the law defense. ,,30 
Mter two-and-a-half more hours of deliberation, the jury returned with a 
verdict of guilty on all counts.31 
24. Id. 
25. This was the second note sent out to the judge. The first note had requested 
a transcript of Cheek's testimony in which he discussed his beliefs. Cheek I, 882 F.2d 
at 1266. 
26. Cheek II, 111 S. Ct. at 608. 
'27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. (citation omitted). 
31. Id. The jury included several notes with the verdict. One note, signed by all 
12 jurors, stated that they found the defendant guilty on all counts but that some jurors 
wished to express their personal opinions, which were "not meant to affect in any way 
their verdict of guilty." Id. The notes were "a complaint against the narrow and hard 
expression under the constraints of the law." Cheek 1,882 F.2d at 1266·67. At least 
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On appeal, Cheek argued that the district court erred by instructing the 
jury that only "an objectively reasonable misunderstanding of the law negates 
the statutory willfulness requirement. ,,32 The Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals rejected his argument and affirmed the convictions.33 The Seventh 
Circuit relied on prior cases that had clearly indicated that a good faith 
misunderstanding of the law must be objectively reasonable to negate the 
willfulness requirement.34 Referring to a prior decision, the court restated its 
holding that certain particular beliefs, including beliefs that tax laws are 
unconstitutional and that wages are not income, would never be objectively 
reasonable.35 
On further appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed the Seventh 
Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its 
decision.36 The Supreme Court held that a defendant's beliefs about the 
validity or unconstitutionality of tax statutes are irrelevant to the issue of 
willfulness and therefore any instruction to disregard them would be proper.37 
A defendant's good faith misunderstanding of the law or good faith belief that 
two of the notes expressed opinions of individual jurors that the petitioner "sincerely 
believed in his cause even though his beliefs might have been unreasonable." Cheek 
II, 111 S. Ct. at 608 n.6. 
32. Cheek II, 111 S. Ct. at 608. 
33. Id. See Cheek I, 882 F.2d at 1263. 
34. Cheek II, 111 S. Ct. at 608-09. See, e.g., United States v. Buckner. 830 F.2d 
102 (7th Cir. 1987). ' 
35. Cheek II, 111 S. Ct. at q09. The Seventh Circuit, in its opinion, noted that: 
[T]he following beliefs, which are stock arguments of the tax protester 
movement, have not been, nor ever will be, considered "objectively 
reasonable" in this circuit: 
(1) the belief that the sixteenth amendment to the constitution was 
improperly ratified and therefore never came into being; 
(2) the belief that the sixteenth amendment is unconstitutional generally; 
(3) the belief that the income tax violates the takings clause of the fifth 
amendment; 
(4) the belief that the tax laws are unconstitutional; 
(5) the belief that wages are not income and therefore are not subject to 
federal income tax laws; 
(6) the belief that filing a tax return violates the privilege against self-
incrimination; and 
(7) the belief that Federal Reserve Notes do not constitute cash or income. 
Cheek I, 882 F.2d at 1268-69 n.2. 
36. Cheek II, 111 S. Ct. at 613. 
37.Id. 
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he is not violating the law will negate willfulness, however, regardless of 
whether or not it is objectively reasonable.38 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The fundamental basis of the federal tax system is voluntary taxpayer . 
compliance with tax laws. Voluntary compliance implies a fictitious 
environment, free from the watchful and pervading view of a fierce tax 
colle9tor.39 It creates an illusion of every citizen faithfully filing tax returns 
and honestly reporting taxable income as part of a duty to the community. 
Although this could be the scenario for a small segment of the taxpaying 
society, voluntary compliance is more realistically achieved by a fear of the 
fierce tax collector who scrutinizes a taxpayer's every move, ready to grab any 
transgressor.40 Voluntary compliance is a primary objective of the Internal 
Revenue Service, which seeks to achieve such compliance by increasing 
simplicity and providing guidance to taxpayers.41 If voluntary compliance 
is so essential to revenue collection, then ignorance of those laws that require 
the payment of taxes should not be a defense to crimes involving the tax 
laws.42 But, in fact, ignorance of the law is a defense to federal tax crimes 
as they are currently written and interpreted.43 This is due, in part, to the 
word "willfully," which is contained in the criminal penalty sections of the 
Internal Revenue Code.44 From this requirement of willfulness emerges the 
ignorance of the law defense. As the instant decision postulates, taxpayers 
cannot "willfully" evade income tax if they have an honest and good faith 
belief that they are not required by law to file tax returns.4S This good faith 
defense to the willfulness requirement raises the primary issue of whether 
taxpayers' good faith beliefs must be reasonable.46 In addition to providing 
a basis for the ignorance of the law defense, the meaning of the term 
"willfully" has long plagued those courts attempting to "apply the standard to 
criminal sanctions in federal tax cases. 
38. Id. at 605. 
39. Yochum, Ignorance of the Law Is No Excuse Except for Tax Crimes, 27 DUQ. 
L. REV. 221, 223 (1989). 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. I.R.C. § 7201 (1988); I.R.C. § 7203 (West Supp. 1991). See supra notes 15-
16 for the text of these statutes. 
45. Cheek I, 882 F.2d at 1270. 
46. Cheek II, 111 S. Ct. at 611. 
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A. Historical Criminal Law Analysis 
Ignorance or mistake of law is the area of substantive criminal law that 
has been surrounded by the most confusion.47 The frequently erroneous 
assumption is that ignorance or mistake of law is not a defense, but that a 
mistake of fact is a defense.48 In fact, ignorance of the law is a defense to 
a criminal charge under certain circumstances. This confusion is further 
compounded by the fact that "ignorance of the law" really encompasses two 
situations, each of which calls for different analyses and produces different 
results. The first situation occurs where defendants lack the mental state49 
required for the commission of the crime and therefore have a valid de-
fense.so The second situation occurs where defendants have the required 
mental state but claim they were unaware that such conduct was prohibited by 
the criminal law. This ordinarily is not recognized as a defense.sl For 
example, defendants do not commit the crime of larceny if, because of 
mistaken understanding of the property laws, they believed that the property 
belonged to them.s2 The crime would be committed, however, if the 
defendant believed it was lawful to take certain property belonging to others 
because it was a community custom.S3 The requisite mental state needed for 
the crime of larceny-intent to steal or take property belonging to another-is 
not present in the first example because defendants believed that the property 
belonged to them and therefore could not have intended to take another 
person's property. The intent to steal, however, is present in the second 
example because they did intend to take property belonging to someone else. 
As one commentator has noted, "[i]t is not the intent to violate the law but the 
intentional doing of the act which is a violation of the law."s4 As illustrated 
by these examples, the basic rule is that "ignorance or mistake of the law is 
47. W. LAFAVE & A. Scan, CRIMINAL LAw § 5.1(a) (2d ed. 1986). 
48. Id. 
49. Generally, crimes have two components: the actus reus and the mens rea. 
The actus reus is a voluntary act or an omission by a defendant. J. DRESSLER, 
UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAw § 9.01[A] (1987). The "mental state provided in the 
definition of an offense" is commonly referred to as mens rea. For example, murder 
is defined by a state as "the intentional killing of a human being by another human 
being." The actus reus of the offense is "the killing of a human being by another 
human being." The mens rea of the offense is "intentional" and therefore the 
defendant is not gUilty of the crime unless he committed the actus reus intentionally. 
Id. § 10.02[c]. 
50. W. LAFAVE & A. Scon, supra note 47, § 5.1(d). 
51. Id. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. 
54. /d. (citing State v. Downs, 116 N.C. 1064,21 S.E. 689 (1895». 
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a defense when it negatives the existence of a mental state essential to the 
crime charged. ,,55 Therefore, pure ignorance of the law (defendants are 
unaware of the statute prohibiting their conduct) and mistake of the law 
(defendants have mistakenly concluded that the relevant statute does not apply 
to their conduct) are not normally defenses to a criminal charge because they 
do not negate the requisite mental state accompanying the act.56 
The nonrecognition of this defense is rooted in an early theory that the 
law is "definite and knowable" and therefore there is a presumption that 
everyone knows the law.57 The benefits and detriments of such a presump-
tion have been continually debated through the years. In a historical context, 
it was once possible for the average citizen to actually know the law when it 
was simple and limited in scope. But this is unrealistic with today's complex 
criminal laws.58 If all defendants were allowed to use an ignorance of the 
law defense, then finders of fact would be consistently confronted with an 
issue they could not readily resolve.59 It is argued that this defense, if 
allowed, would create a shield for the guilty because the defendants' ignorance 
claims would be difficult to repudiate.60 Additionally, if defendants were 
actually ignorant of the law, an extensive analysis would be necessary to 
determine whether or not the defendants were at fault in not knowing the 
law.61 The balancing of defendants' and society's interests cuts against 
recognizing an ignorance of the law defense. Although the result may be 
harsh on defendants who were reasonably ignorant of the law, the interest of 
the general public far outweighs that of the individua1.62 By convicting 
defendants of the crimes for which they claim an ignorance defense, the 
existence of these laws is brought home to the public and helps to establish 
them in the community.63 
55. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOIT, supra note 47, § 5.1(a). In this regard, the Model 
Penal Code states: 
(1) Ignorance or mistake as to a matter of fact or law is a defense if: 
(a) the ignorance or mistake negatives the purpose, knowledge, belief, 
recklessness or negligence required to establish a material element of the 
offense; or 
(b) the law provides that the state of mind established by such 
ignorance or mistake constitutes a defense. 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(1) (1991). 
56. W. LAFAyE & A. SCOIT, supra note 47, § 5.1(d). 
57. Id. (citing Weeks v. State, 24 Ala. App. 198, 132 So. 870 (1931». 
58. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOIT, supra note 47, § 5.1(d). 
59. ld. 
60. ld. (citing People v. O'Brien, 96 Cal. 171,31 P. 45 (1892». 
61. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOIT, supra note 47, § 5.1(d). 
62. ld. 
63. ld. 
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Despite the balancing of the public interest, a "good faith" ignorance of 
the law is a recognized defense in the area of tax crimes.64 The Supreme 
Court clearly supports this good faith defense, as evidenced by the landmark 
case of United States v. Murdock, 6S where it was recognized that: 
Congress did not intend that a person, by reason of a bona fide misunder-
standing as to his liability for the tax, as to his duty to make a return, or as 
to the adequacy of the records he maintained, should become a criminal by 
his mere failure to measure up to the prescribed standard of conduct. 66 
The Murdock decision and its interpretation of the statutory term "willfully" 
created an exception to the traditional rule and began special treatment for 
criminal tax offenses because of the complexity of tax laws.67 
B. Federal Tax Crimes and the "Willfulness" Requirement 
1. Statutory Overview 
The belief that the stigma of a criminal conviction and imprisonment will 
help preserve a tax system based on voluntary compliance is fundamental to 
the criminal tax enforcement program.68 The main criminal sanction utilized 
to attain that conviction is section 7201, which provides that any person "who 
willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax" is guilty of a 
felony and upon conviction can be subject to fines of up to $100,000 and 
imprisonment of up to five years.69 The Supreme Court, in Spies v. United 
States,1° labeled this section as "the capstone of a system of sanctions" that 
were intended to "induce prompt and forthright fulfillment of every duty under 
the income tax law and to provide a penalty suitable to every degree of 
delinquency.,,71 In Sansone v. United States,72 the Supreme Court delineat-
ed the elements of section 7201 as willfulness, a tax deficiency, and an 
64. See United States v. Flitcraft, 803 F.2d 184, 186-87 (5th Cir. 1986), reh'g 
denied, 863 F.2d 342 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 490 U.S. 1080 (1989) (discusses several 
cases which address this "good faith" defense). 
65. 290 U.S. 389 (1933). 
66. Id. at 396. 
67. Cheek II, 111 S. Ct. at 609. 
68. Davis, Recent Developments in Criminal Tax Matters, 47 INST. ON FED. 
TAX'N § 46.01[1] (1989). 
69. I.R.C. § 7201 (1990). See supra note 15 for the full text of this statute. 
70. 317 U.S. 492 (1943). 
71. Id. at 497. 
72. 380 U.S. 343 (1965). 
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affirmative act that constitutes an evasion or an attempted evasion of the 
tax.73 
Another criminal sanction can be imposed under section 7203, which 
criminalizes the willful failure to pay a tax or file a tax return.74 Violation 
of this section is a misdemeanor with fines of up to $25,000 and a maximum 
of one year of imprisonment.7s A section 7203 misdemeanor requires proof 
that (1) a legal duty to file a tax return existed; (2) there was a failure to do 
so; and (3) the defendant acted willfully.76 The purpose of section 7203 is 
to encompass omissions that would not be sufficient for a conviction under 
section 7201.77 A failure to file without more, such as an affirmative act, 
will not sustain a section 7201 conviction.78 
The most widely used criminal sanction is 26 U.S.C. section 7206, which 
makes it a crime to "[w]i1lfully [make] and [subscribe] any return ... or other 
document which contains or is verified by a written declaration that it is under 
penalties of perjury and he does not believe to be true and correct as to every 
material matter. ,r79 Violations of section 7206 are felonies, and upon 
conviction can result in fines of up to $100,000 and imprisonment of up to 
three years.80 
The pivotal element of each of these criminal sanctions is willfulness.81 
Congress included a "willfulness" element in the criminal tax statutes to 
implement a "pervasive intent . • . to construct penalties that separate the 
purposeful tax violator from the well-meaning, but easily confused, mass of 
taxpayers."S2 In its attempt to separate these two types of taxpayers, 
however, Congress has succeeded in adding confusion to court decisions 
attempting to interpret the "willfulness" element. 
73. Id. at 351. 
74. I.R.C. § 7203 (West Supp. 1991). See supra note 16 for the full text of this 
statute. 
75. Id. 
76. United States v. Gorman, 393 F.2d 209, 213 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 
832 (1968). 
77. Peterson, Tax fraud: What steps the attorney can take to defend his client 
against it, 5 TAXATION FOR LAWYERS 244, 244 (1977). 
78. Spies, 317 U.S. at 499. 
79. Id. See I.R.C. § 7206 (1988). 
80. I.R.C. § 7206(1) (1988). 
81. Peterson, supra note 77, at 244. 
82. Note, Criminal Liability for Willful Evasion of an Uncertain Tax, 81 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1348, 1354 (1981) (quoting Spies, 317 U.S. at 497-98). 
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2. The "Willfulness" Requirement 
The first case to construe this distinguishing element was United States 
v. Murdock 83 In Murdock, the Supreme Court held that a taxpayer in a 
criminal prosecution under the predecessor to 26 U.S.C. section 720584 was 
entitled to a jury instruction stating that the jury, in ascertaining willfulness, 
could consider whether a refusal to comply was "in good faith and based upon 
his actual belief."as The Court noted that the word "willfully" often signifies 
an act that is "intentional, or knowing, or voluntary, as distinguished from 
accidental. But, when used in a criminal statute, it generally means an act 
done with a bad purpose ... ,,,86 or with "an evil motive .... ,,87 
In Spies v. United States, the Supreme Court reviewed a tax evasion 
conviction under the predecessor to section 7201. The defendant claimed 
psychological disturbance as a defense for his failure to file a return and pay 
tax.88 The Court rejected the trial court's interpretation of the term "willful-
ly" as "voluntarili' because it failed to give effecno an inferred congressional 
intent that was evidenced by classifying certain crimes as felonies and others 
as misdemeanors.89 The Court held that the difference between the two 
offenses-a willful failure to pay tax when due under section 7203 and a 
willful attempt to evade or defeat taxes under section 1201-was that the 
latter felony involves "some willful commission in addition to the willful 
omissions that make up the list of misdemeanors. ,,90 In reference to what 
affirmative action would constitute a willful attempt, the Court stated that an 
inference could be made from the following conduct: 
keeping a double set of books, making false entries or alterations, or false 
invoices or documents, destruction of books or records, concealment of 
assets or covering up sources of income, handling of one's affairs to avoid 
making the records usual in transactions of the kind, and any conduct, the 
likely effect of which would be to mislead or to concea1.91 
83. 290 U.S. 389, 393 (1933). 
84. I.R.C. § 7205 (West Supp. 1991) (addresses the fraudulent withholding 
exemption certificate or failure to supply information). 
85. Yochum, supra note 39, at 224 (quoting United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 
389, 393 (1933». 
86. Murdock, 290 U.S. at 394. 
87. [d. at 395. 
88. Spies, 317 U.S. at 493. 
89. [d. at 497. 
90. [d. at 499. 
91. [d. 
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Spies, however, left some confusion as to whether the word "willfully" was 
to be applied uniformly, or in varying degrees depending on the tax felonies 
and misdemeanors set forth in sections 7201-7207.92 
In United States v. Bishop,93 the Supreme Court attempted to clarify the 
application of the term "willfully." The Court held that Congress distin-
guished the misdemeanor and felony statutes in ways that did not turn on the 
meaning of the word "willfully".94 The Court stated that the distinction was 
founded on "the additional misconduct which is essential to the violation of 
the felony statute ... and not in the quality of willfulness which characterizes 
the wrongdoing. ,,95 
The Supreme Court abandoned the evil motive characterization of 
"willfully" in United States v. Pomponio.96 The Court held that the term 
"willful" as used in section 7206, which makes it a felony to willfully file a 
false income tax return, simply meant a "voluntary, intentional violation of a 
known legal duty.,,97 Additionally, there was no requirement to find an evil 
motive beyond a specific inlent to violate the law.98 
3. The Good-Faith Defense: Subjective Versus Objective Standard 
Despite the Court's clarification in Pomponio, differences among the 
circuits arose over the application of the "known legal duty" or knowledge 
requirement. Particularly, the courts differed over whether a good faith 
ignorance of the law had to be objectively reasonable to be a defense.99 In 
United States v. Aitken,loo the First Circuit Court of Appeals contemplated 
whether willfulness meant a subjective intent to disobey the law or "merely 
the absence of what a jury would consider an objectively reasonable ground 
for failure to comply."lOl The First Circuit rejected the trial court's jury 
instruction that a mistaken belief must be reasonably held and ruled that 
willfulness must be evaluated subjectively.102 As one commentator poi-
gnantly stated, the outrageousness of the belief that an exchange of time for 
92. See United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 356, 360 n.8 (1973). 
93. 412 U.S. 346 (1973). 
94. Id. at 358. 
95. [d. at 358-59 (quoting United States v. Vitiello, 363 F.2d 240, 243 (3d Cir. 
1966». 
96. 429 U.S. 10 (1976). 
97. Id. at 12. 
98. [d. 
99. Yochum, supra note 39, at 229. 
100. 755 F.2d 188 (1st Cir. 1985). 
101. [d. at 189. 
102. [d. at 192. 
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money was not income "should certainly influence the jury's determination as 
to whether the belief is actually held [by the taxpayer], but if held, the 
taxpayer is innocent. ,,103 
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a taxpayer's 
conviction in United States v. Burton104 because the trial court instructed the 
jury that the defendant's belief that wages were not income was no de-
fense.10S The Fifth Circuit sympathized with trial judges who believed that 
many defendants were able to escape justice by using shrewd arguments that 
confused juries about the actual state of the law.106 The court hoped, 
however, that the outrageousness of the defendant's alleged belief would 
influence the jury when considering the defendant's credibility.l07 
Disregarding the majority of other circuits that have held that a subjective 
standard is necessary in evaluating willfulness,l08 the Seventh Circuit 
adopted an "objectively reasonable" standard in United States v. Moore.10') 
In Moore, a tax protestor who filed a return with only his name, address, and 
social security number, was charged with failure to file. no The protestor 
claimed that Federal Reserve Notes were not legal tender or money and 
therefore were not taxable as income.111 The trial court jury instructions 
defined willfully as a violation of a known legal duty and then stated that "the 
question is, did he reasonably believe" the returns were adequate or properly 
filed. ll2 The Seventh Circuit upheld the instruction, although deeming it 
unnecessary, and stated that "the mistake of law defense is extremely limited 
and the mistake must be objectively reasonable."l13 
103. Yochum, supra note 39, at 228. 
104. 737 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1984). 
105. ld. at 441. 
106. ld. at 442-43. 
107. ld. at 443. 
108. See United States v. Whiteside, 810 F.2d 1306, 1310-11 (5th Cir. 1987); 
United States v. Aitken, 755 F.2d 188, 192-93 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v. 
Phillips, 775 F.2d 262, 263-64 (10th Cir. 1985); United States v. Burton, 737 F.2d 
439,441-42 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. Kraeger, 711 F.2d 6, 7 (2d Cir. 1983); 
United States v. Ingredient Technology Corp., 698 F.2d 88, 97 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
462 U.S. 1131 (1983); Cooley V. United States, 501 F.2d 1249, 1253 (9th Cir. 1974), 
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1123 (1975); Mann V. United States, 319 F.2d 404,409-10 (5th 
Cir. 19(>3), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 986 (1964); Yarborough v. United States, 230 F.2d 
56,61 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 969 (1956); Battjes V. United States, 172 F.2d 
1, 4 (6th Cir. 1949). 
109. 627 F.2d 830 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.~. 619 (1981). 
110. ld. at 831. 
111. ld. at 833. 
112. ld. 
113. ld. 
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In ,United States v. Phillips,114 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
explicitly rejected the Moore decision by holding that a subjective rather than 
an objective standard should be applied in assessing a defendant's claimed 
belief that he was not required under the law to file a return because wages 
were not income.llS Despite Phillips' criticism of Moore, the Seventh 
Circuit held steadfast to its objective standard in its subsequent decision of 
United States v. Foster.116 The court held that in proving willfulness the 
government was only required to show that the defendant intentionally 
violated a known legal duty, without demonstrating any bad purpose on his 
part, and that any mistake on the defendant's part must be "objectively 
reasonable.,,117 
Discussions about the Seventh Circuit's position that an objective 
standard is necessary to establish lack of willfulness have concluded that the 
court was simply wrong. us As defined by the Supreme Court, these 
criminal tax offenses require an element of knowledge of the legal duty,119 
Whether defendants' beliefs 'of the legality of their actions are correct or 
incorrect, or reasonable or unreasonable, are irrelevant to determining 
willfulness. 120 The only issue is whether or not those beliefs were in fact 
held by the defendants.12l An explicit disagreement with the law; however, 
is not a defense, nor is a mistake or ignorance of the law.122 Taxpayers 
cannot use a belief that taxes are being collected from them for an improper 
purpose as a defense to tax evasion or failure to file a return. l23 
In United States v. House/24 the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Michigan held that a good faith belief that tax laws are 
unconstitutional does not negate the element of willfulness.l2S The court 
114. 775 F.2d 262 (10th Cir. 1985). 
115. Id. at 264. 
116. 789 F.2d 457 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 883 (1986); see also Cheek 
1,882 F.2d at 1267; United States v. Buckner, 830 F.2d 102, 103 (7th Cir. 1987). 
117. United States v. Foster, 789 F.2d 457, 461 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 
883 (1986). 
118. Yochum, supra note 39, at 230. 
119. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
120. See Note, supra note 82, at 1356. 
121. See id. 
122. See Yochum, supra note 39, at 230. 
123. Id. 
124. 617 F. Supp. 232 (W.D. Mich. 1985), affd by order, 787 F.2d 593 (6th Cir. 
1986). 
125. Id. at 234. The court additionally held that a good faith misunderstanding 
of the law's requirement negates the element of willfulness. Id. at 234. See also 
United States v. Harrold, 796 F.2d 1275 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1037 
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explained that it was "immediately apparent that the premise of these decisions 
[cases from other circuits with similar holdings] is that in each case the 
defendant mew of the tax law and was not uncertain about the duty Congress 
meant to impose."I26 The court, in agreement with the government, recog-
nized that there was a "difference between willful defiance of a statute and 
ignorance of a statute's existence or meaning."m Nonrecognition of the 
unconstitutionality defense distinguishes citizens who simply choose not to 
adhere to a known legal duty from those who act based on ignorance or a 
misunderstanding of the law.l28 The court ruled that a, jury could be 
instructed to "draw an inference that the defendant was aware of his legal 
obligation from acts taken in protest to or to express a political view, even 
though made with conviction and sincerity of purpose. ,,129 Therefore, the 
distinction between a good faith disagreement with the law, which is not a 
defense, and a good faith misunderstanding or ignorance of the law, which is 
a defense, is crucial to defendants in attempting to negate willfulness. 
Despite the ostensible fact that no other -'circuits had adopted its 
objectively reasonable standard as to the ignorance or misunderstanding of the 
law defense, the Seventh Circuit continued its application of this standard in 
(1987) (upheld conviction of taxpayer who filed no returns on grounds wages were not 
taxable; good faith disagreement with the tax laws not a defense; instruction on good 
faith misunderstanding as defense is appropriate only if there is evidence from which 
jury could reasonably fmd defendant misunderstood what law required of him); United 
States v. Payne, 800 F.2d 227 (10th Cir. 1986) (belief tax laws violate constitutional 
rights is not good faith misunderstanding); United States v. Mueller, 778 F.2d 539 (9th 
Cir. 1985); United States v. Gleason, 726 F.2d 385 (8th Cir. 1984); United States v. 
Kraeger, 711 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Romero, 640 F.2d 1014 (9th Cir. 
1981); United States v. Jones, 628 F.2d 402 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 967 
(1981) (good faith belief in unconstitutionality of Federal Reserve System did not 
constitute legal defense to willful failure to file); United States v. Crowhurst, 629 F.2d 
1297, 1298 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1021 (1980) (defendant's disagreement 
with Internal Revenue Service's definition of "gross income" did not entitle him to 
violate the law by failing to file proper return); United States v. Karsky, 610 F.2d 548 
(8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1092 (1980) (good faith disagreement with the 
law does not negate willfulness). See also supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
126. United States v. House, 617 F. Supp. 232, 234 (W.O. Mich. 1985), affd by 
order, 787 F.2d 593 (6th Cir. 1986) (quoting Burton, 737 F.2d at 442-43). 
127. House, 617 F. Supp. at 234. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. 
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United States v. Cheek,130 and was reversed by the United States Supreme 
Court.131 
IV. INSTANT DECISION 
The Court in Cheek began its discussion by recognizing the general rule 
that ignorance or mistake of law is not a defense to a criminal prosecu-
tion.132 The majority restated the common law presumption that every 
person knows the law, while recognizing that the magnitude of statutes and 
regulations have complicated attempts by taxpayers to comprehend their tax 
duties under the law.133 The Court noted that by requiring an element of 
specific intent to violate the law for certain tax crimes, Congress has reduced 
the effect of the common law presumption.134 The Court mentioned that its 
interpretation of "willfully" in Murdock created an exception to the traditional 
rule for criminal tax offenses.13S The complexity of the tax laws is the 
major reason for this special treatment.136 In reference to its prior decisions 
in Bishop and Pomponio, the Court stated that the standard for statutory 
willfulness has been conclusively refined from "an act done with a bad 
purpose"137 to a "voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty."138 
Willfulness, as interpreted by prior decisions, requires the government to 
prove that the defendant had a duty imposed by law, knowledge of that duty, 
and a voluntary and intentional violation of that duty.139 The Court held 
that the government satisfies the knowledge element of willfulness by proving 
that knowledge of the relevant legal duty existed.14o This burden, however, 
also requires the government to negate a defendant's good faith claim of 
ignorance or misunderstanding of the law.141 The reason for this burden, 
postulated the Court, is that an individual cannot be cognizant that the law 
imposes a duty upon him and still be unaware of it, misunderstand it, or 
130. 882 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1108 (1990), 
vacated, 111 S. Ct. 604 (1991). 
131. Cheek II, 111 S. Ct. at 604. 
132. Id. at 609. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text. 
136. Cheek II, 111 S. Ct. at 609. 
137. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
138. Cheek II, 111 S. Ct. at 610. See supra notes 93-98 and accompanying text. 
139. Cheek II, 111 S. Ct. at 610. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. at 610-11. 
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believe that the duty is nonexistent.142 The resulting issue was narrowly 
stated as follows: 
Whether, based on all the evidence, the Government has proved that the 
defendant was aware of the duty at issue, which cannot be true if the jury 
credits a good-faith misunderstanding and belief submission, whether or not 
the claimed belief or misunderstanding is objectively reasonable.143 
The Court, in applying this standard, explained that if Cheek declared 
that he truly believed that the Code did not treat wages as income, and the 
jury believed him, then the government did not meet its burden of proving 
willfulness, regardless of the unreasonableness of the belief.l44 The jury, in 
assigning credibility to the defendant's good faith defense, can consider any 
admissible evidence from any source revealing the defendant's awareness of 
his duty.14s Based on this explanation, the Court explicitly disagreed with 
the Seventh Circuit's assertion that an alleged good-faith belief be objectively 
reasonable to be considered by the jury as negating a defendant's awareness 
of a legal duty.l46 The Court explained that knowledge and belief are 
customarily questions for the jury or factfinder.147 If a particular belief is 
characterized as not objectively reasonable, the analysis becomes a legal one, 
thus precluding jury consideration.l48 The Court felt that it was plausible 
for a defendant to be unaware of his duty because of an irrational belief that 
he did not have one. Therefore, any attempt to prevent jury consideration on 
this issue could raise serious implications under the seventh amendment jury 
trial provision.149 Accordingly, the Court held that it was error to instruct 
the jury to disregard Cheek's claim that he was not a person required to file 
a return or pay taxes and that wages were not taxable income, regardless of 
the ridiculous nature of these claims. ISO 
142. Id. at 611. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. This includes evidence showing the defendant's knowledge of relevant 
Code sections or regulations, court decisions rejecting his interpretation of the law, 
authoritative rulings of the Service, or any contents of the personal return forms and 
accompanying instructions that made it clear that income included wages. Id. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. 
149. !d. (citing Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985); Sandstrom v. Montana, 
442 U.S. 510 (1979); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952)). 
150. Cheek II, 111 S. Ct. at 611-12. 
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The Supreme Court also held, however, that the trial court did not err in 
instructing the jury to disregard Cheek's assertions that tax laws are unconsti-
tutional. lSl The Court regarded Cheek's position as "unsound:' not because 
it failed to be objectively reasonable, but because it lacked support from the 
Murdock-Pomponio line of cases.1S2 That line of cases interpreted the 
willfulness requirement of the Code's criminal provisions to mandate proof of 
knowledge of the law.1S3 The Court then explained the reason for that 
requirement: 
[I]n our complex tax system, uncertainty often arises even among taxpayers 
who earnestly wish to follow the law [and it] is not the purpose of the law 
to penalize frank differences of opinion or innocent errors made despite the 
exercise of reasonable care.154 
The Court felt, however, that claims that certain Code provIsIons are 
unconstitutional require different treatment than claims of ignorance or 
misunderstanding of the law. ISS The Court asserted that claims of unconsti-
tutionality do not arise from unintentional mistakes caused by the complexity 
of the Code.1s6 Rather, these claims expose full awareness of the provisions 
in dispute and a "studied conclusion, however wrong, that those provisions are 
invalid and unenforceable."ls7 
151. Id. at 612. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. See supra notes 83-98 and accompanying text. 
154. Cheek 11,111 S. Ct. at 612 (quoting Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 
496 (1943)). 
155. Id. at 612. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. at 612-13. The court's view disregarding unconstitutionality as a defense 
conforms with all the circuits that have ruled on the issue. These decisions reflect the 
similar opinion that the claim reveals awareness of the law and a decision not to 
adhere to it, which cannot rightfully negate the knowledge element of willfulness. See 
supra notes 118-122 and accompanying text. 
Justice Scalia, however, who joined only in the judgment of the Cheek decision, 
insisted that, "[i]t is quite impossible to say that a statute which one believes 
unconstitutional represents a" 'known legal duty.'" Cheek II, 111 S. Ct. at 614. 
Regarding the knowledge element of willfulness, Justice Scalia further commented that: 
Id. 
[G]ne may say, as we [Supreme Court] have said until today with respect 
to the tax statutes, that 'willfully' refers to consciousness of both the act 
and its illegality. But it seems to me impossible to say that the word refers 
to consciousness that some legal text is binding, i.e., with the good-faith 
belief that it is not a valid law. 
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In applying this view to the present case, the Court determined that 
Cheek, after paying his taxes for years, attended various seminars and 
conducted a personal study before concluding that tax laws could not 
constitutionally impose a duty on him to pay taxes. ISS Therefore, the Court 
believed that Congress did not contemplate that a taxpayer, like Cheek, could 
ignore his legal duty and simultaneously refuse to utilize the available 
statutory mechanisms without risking criminal prosecution.159 In reference 
to these statutory mechanisms, the Court reasoned that Cheek was free to pay 
taxes from year to year, file for a refund, and if denied, offer his claims of 
unconstitutionality, invalid or otherwise, to the courts. l60 Therefore, the 
Court decided that Cheek was in no position to claim that his good faith belief 
regarding the invalidity of the Code provided a defense to willfulness under 
sections 7201 and 7203.161 This decision was qualified by stating that 
Cheek was, of course, free to present his claims and have them adjudicated at 
the risk of being held wrong.162 
In conclusion, the Court held that the defendant's opinions regarding the 
validity of tax statutes were irrelevant to the issue of willfulness, that they did 
not require jury consideration, and that any instruction to disregard them 
would be proper.163 Additionally, the outrageousness or substance of a 
claim is not consequentiaI.I64 The jury, however, in deciding if the defen-
, 
dant acted willfully, should consider whether the defendant's assertions that 
wages are not income or that he was not a taxpayer under the Code provisions 
are objectively reasonable or not.16S 
158. Id. 
159. Id. at 613. 
160. Id. (citing I.R.C. § 7422 (1988». The Court also mentioned that, "without 
paying the tax, he [Cheek] could have challenged claims of tax deficiencies in the Tax 
Court, 26 U.S.C. § 6213, with a right to appeal to a higher court if unsuccessful. 
§ 7482(a)(I)." Cheek II, 111 S. Ct. at 613. 
161. Cheek II, 111 S. Ct. at 613. 
162. Id. 
163. Id. 
164. Id. 
165. /d. In their dissenting opinion, Justices Blackmun and Marshall made the 
observation that a commercial airline pilot is "presumably ... a person of at least 
minimum intellectual competence." Id. at 615. They feIt that the "objectively 
reasonable" standard gave the defendant more, rather than less, protection because it 
provided another obstacle for the prosecution to overcome. Id. They concluded by 
commenting that "[T]his Court's opinion today. . . will encourage taxpayers to cling 
to frivolous views of the law in the hope of convincing a jury of their sincerity. If that 
ensues ... we have gone beyond the limits of common sense." Id. 
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V. COMMENT 
The Supreme Court's holding in Cheek v. United States is logical from 
a purely legal viewpoint. As discussed previously, the Supreme Court requires 
the element of knowledge of a legal duty in criminal tax offenses.l66 This 
element does not require any lack of knowledge to be reasonable. The only 
issue is whether or not those beliefs were in fact held by the defendant, 
correctly or incorrectly, reasonably or unreasonably.167 Additionally, the 
Cheek decision certainly conforms with the decision of every circuit except 
the Seventh Circuit.l68 It is important to note that this holding does not 
relieve taxpayers of their ultimate obligations to pay taxes, even though it does 
give them a greater ability to escape criminal penalties. 
Proponents of the subjective standard argue that even if the defendant's 
alleged belief is outrageously unreasonable, it "should certainly influence the 
jury's determination as to whether the belief is actually held" by the 
taxpayer.l69 Therefore, proponents place their hopes on the fact that the 
outrageousness of the belief will lead a jury to determine that there was no 
possible way that the defendant could have held that belief in good faith. 
Even if the jury is instructed to apply a subjective standard to determine 
whether the defendant actually held this belief, however, there is no guarantee 
that the jury will not place themselves in the defendant's shoes and find that 
there is no way they would have acted similarly in his situation. Likewise, 
there is no guarantee that a jury consisting of hardworking and taxpaying 
citizens will not become so personally outraged by a defendant's frivolous 
beliefs that they will convict the taxpayer under a "I pay so you should pay" 
standard, regardless of the fact that the defendant might have actually held a 
bona fide, albeit incorrect, belief. Especially during times of tax increases, 
citizens who honestly and consistently pay their taxes are not likely to look 
kindly upon non-taxpaying citizens asserting ridiculous beliefs that wages are 
not income or that they are not a taxable person under the Internal Revenue 
Code. In reality, it is possible that an objective standard will be applied 
irrespective of the Court's instructions. This reality gives more credence to 
the Seventh Circuit's objectively reasonable standard. 
The views of the Seventh Circuit and the dissenters in Cheek attempt to 
achieve a level of practicality beyond the mere defense itself. Their position 
places even more emphasis on the voluntary compliance objective of the 
federal tax system. The "objectively reasonable" standard mandates that 
taxpaying participants have a rational and reasonably based misunderstanding 
166. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
167. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
168. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
169. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
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of the tax law before a defense will be available to them. Thus, the 
"objectively reasonable" standard encourages taxpayers to seek advice on 
confusing and seemingly unascertainable tax laws rather than to just ignore 
them because the criminal penalties could be severe if willful noncompliance 
is found. If an objectively reasonable standard is not imposed, then the 
prediction of the dissenters in Cheek co.uld become a reality. The subjective 
standard "will encourage taxpayers to cling to frivolous views of the law in 
the hope of convincing a jury of their sincerity."17o The tax court and other 
federal district courts could become overrun with taxpayers asserting frivolous 
beliefs that they are not subject to tax, hoping that a jury would find in their 
favor. With court dockets clogged to capacity, the Supreme Court's holding 
in Cheek invites even more disgruntled taxpayers to "have their day in court" 
and assert any frivolous and outrageous proposition as their own, as long as 
it involves a misunderstanding or ignorance of the law. 
In addition to the effect on the court system, Cheek will have an impact 
both inside and outside the area of tax practice. The decision certainly places 
a greater burden on the Service in criminal tax cases. Not only must the 
government prove that the defendant had knowledge of a legal duty, but it 
must also negate any claim of ignorance or misunderstanding of the law that 
the defendant raises. l7l As noted in one commentary: "By stressing the 
prosecution's burden to prove that the defendant had the subjective intent to 
violate the law, the Court reinforced the frequent claim by white-collar 
defendants that they had no idea that their conduct violated the law."l72 
Therefore, a greater effort must pe placed on analyzing the subjective 
intent or state of the mind of the defendant. Because it is a state of mind, 
willfulness can be proved only by the defendant's testimony or by circumstan-
tial evidence of the particular surrounding facts, such as concealment of assets, 
double bookkeeping, and other avoidance techniques.173 If circumstantial 
evidence does not exist, however, a subjective state of mind provides an 
almost insurmountable barrier to proving willfulness. 
Outside the confines of tax practice, the Supreme Court's interpretation 
of the willfulness requirement could be applied to other federal offenses that 
contain a willfulness element.174 In a review of the decision, one commenta-
tor observed that, "[t]he application of Cheek to other statutes may turn on 
whether the offense involves a complex regulatory or statutory structure 
170. See supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
171. See supra notes 140-141 and accompanying text. 
172. Stewart, Supreme Court Report: Springtime for Criminals, 77 A.B.A. J. 43 
(March 1991). 
173. See Note, supra note 82, at 1355. 
174. Stewart, supra note 172, at 46. 
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imposing duties that a defendant might well understand. lI175 Currency-
reporting requirements under the banking laws and complex submissions and , 
certification requirements of federal contractors were statutes listed as 
examples.176 Therefore, the effect of Cheek will be felt by tax practitioners as 
well as practitioners in other highly regulated and complex legal areas, where 
a mere misunderstanding or ignorance of the law, no matter how unreasonable, 
could prevent successful criminal prosecution. The Supreme Court's holding 
in Cheek signifies a step backwards in achieving the voluntary compliance 
objective of the federal tax system. Courts that hear tax cases will become 
overrun with taxpayers asserting frivolous beliefs that they are not subject to 
tax in an attempt to evade criminal penalties. Enforcers of the voluntary 
compliance tax system must now face the added burden of trying to prove the 
subjective intent of the defendant. This will encourage taxpayers to escape 
criminal penalties by asserting outrageous IIgood faithll beliefs that negate the 
willfulness element, and with greater ability to escape criminal penalties, they 
may be more inclined to risk nonpayment of tax because civil penalties will 
be the only certain result. 
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